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I.

INTRODUCTION

Sia result of a dramatic, and largely unexpected, series of recent deciions by the United States Supreme Court, both the federal sentencing system and the sentencing systems in a number of states are in turmoil.
The era of mandatory federal Sentencing Guidelines, with narrow ranges
based on facts determined by judges on a preponderance of the evidence
standard, is over. For now, the guidelines remain in place, but in an "advisory," not binding capacity. Congress is already considering what legislative changes to make to this new reality, and this debate may be as farreaching in importance as the one that led to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act' and the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines.
3
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 Blakely v. Washington and United States v.
Booker,4 the Supreme Court announced and extended a rule that under
the Sixth Amendment, 5 facts that increase the maximum punishment to
A

* Distinguished Reuschlein Visiting Professor, Villanova University School of
Law. Dean designee, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. This article, in an
earlier form, served as the basis for the Reuschlein Lecture at Villanova University
School of Law in October 2004. The author would like to thank Steve Chanenson
for helpful comments, and Kelli Babinecz and Lynne O'Brien for their excellent
research assistance.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1984).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
4. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.

(163)
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which the defendant is exposed must be determined beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury, unless admitted by the defendant. Despite this ruling, a
federal defendant will not necessarily have a sentencing fact determined
by a jury. Further, it is far from clear that once the dust clears and Congress has spoken, the new federal sentencing system will be fairer or more
just than the system that the Court invalidated in Booker.
On the other hand, the federal sentencing system under the binding
guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes in effect produced such
profound failures that we should welcome the opportunity provided by
the Supreme Court to reconsider the system. This is perhaps the one real
chance to revive the spirit of reform that initially led to the guidelines
movement.
Part II of this Article reviews the past several decades of the sentencing reform movement. During that movement, the federal system and
many states rejected the traditional discretionary sentencing system and
replaced it with structured sentencing mechanisms such as sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes. One of the principal goals
and effects of sentencing reform is to bring law to sentencing. Prior to the
Supreme Court's recent decisions, though, a great deal of procedural informality, some would say unfairness, was still permitted.
Part III summarizes the line of cases beginning with Apprendi and extending through Booker that has now revolutionized sentencing. Part IV
examines the options available to Congress and makes policy recommendations. In sum, I believe that the best policy after Booker is for Congress
to direct the Sentencing Commission to revise and simplify the Sentencing
Guidelines, and to submit disputed facts to juries for decision. Simplified
guidelines that provide judges with more flexibility will be both workable
under Booker and more in keeping with the original goals of sentencing
reform.
II.

A QUICK

HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING REFORM MOVEMENT

One of the most dramatic developments in the criminal justice system
over the past twenty-five years was the transformation of the sentencing
process. For most of the twentieth century, criminal offenders were sentenced based on a medical or rehabilitative model, and judicial discretion
and parole release marked the sentencing system. 6 Typically, ajudge sentencing a convicted defendant was constrained only by the maximum sentence authorized by statute. 7 The judge could impose probation, some
6. See, e.g., Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225

(1993) ("From the beginning of the Republic, federal judges were entrusted with
wide sentencing discretion .... The great majority of federal criminal statutes have
stated only a maximum term of years... permitting the sentencing judge to impose any term of imprisonment and any fine up to the statutory maximums.").
7. See id. (noting traditional rule that sentencing judges could impose any
sentence up to statutory maximum).
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other nonincarcerative sanction or a prison term of any length up to the
statutory maximum. The judge could consider virtually any available information about the offender and the offense when deciding whether,
and for what length of time, prison was appropriate.
The sentences imposed were indeterminate-a sentenced offender
was initially informed only as to the maximum possible duration of the
term to be served. A parole board usually determined the actual time
served. 8 Typically, an inmate became eligible for parole after serving onethird of the maximum sentence and could be released any time from then
9
until completion of the entire sentence. The parole board, in theory,
made an individualized assessment of the offender's needs and progress
and ordered the offender's release only when rehabilitation was
accomplished.10
The reality of this system, of course, always diverged greatly from its
aspirations. The prison environment hardly fosters rehabilitation, even
for inmates committed to reforming themselves. The "science" of parole
release proved incapable of predicting, with any great accuracy, which inmates were ready to become law-abiding citizens. Nonetheless, the system
sketched above remained largely unchanged for many years.
The traditional sentencing system came under increasing attack in
11
Both conservatives and liberals criticized
the late 1960s and early 1970s.
then existing sentencing practices. Conservatives viewed rehabilitation as
a failed ideal. 12 After a century of reform-based penology, crime rates
were high and recidivism widespread. To these critics, judicial discretion
13
and parole produced much mischief. Too many liberal judges were free
8. See id. at 226 (explaining that "parole authorities were assigned the task of
determining the actual release date for most federal prisoners").
9. See id. (discussing federal prisoner parole availability).
10. See id. at 227 (explaining that when rehabilitation was viewed as one goal
of imprisonment, "parole officers' power to determine a sentence's duration was
seen both as a valuable incentive to prison inmates to rehabilitate themselves and
as a vehicle to permit 'experts' to determine when sufficient rehabilitation had
occurred to warrant release from prison").
11. The publication of a thoughtful book by a sitting judge was a critical moment in the development of the sentencing reform movement. See generally MARyIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER (1973) (criticizing preGuidelines discretionary system for often producing unfair sentences and arguing
for structured sentencing system).
12. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat. 1837) 3182, 3221 ("In the Federal system today, criminal
sentencing is based largely on an outmoded rehabilitation model .... [A]lmost
everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilitation can
be induced reliably in a prison setting."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (discussing reports of "'outmoded rehabilitation model' for
federal criminal sentencing"); Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 227 (describing conservative critiques of rehabilitation).
13. See generallyJoseph C. Howard, Racial Discriminationin Sentencing, 69 JUDICATURE 121 (1975) (discussing specifically how judicial sentencing discretion led
to different sentences for prisoners of different races).
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to impose lenient sentences, and social work-oriented parole boards released offenders too early. Liberals also doubted the effectiveness of rehabilitation and were troubled that offenders were incarcerated "for their
own good." 14 Liberals also found judicial discretion problematic because
it led to sentencing disparities, especially by race and class, in which simi15
lar criminal offenders in similar cases received quite different sentences.
In addition, some liberals viewed the system as basically "lawless," with no
guiding principles for judges to follow, rampant procedural unfairness
and an absence of meaningful appellate review.
Conservatives and liberals agreed that the sentencing system was
deeply flawed. 16 Although important differences existed in how each diagnosed the problems, leading liberals and conservatives formed an alliance aimed at reforming the sentencing system. They agreed on several
fundamental points.
First, both sides agreed that unwarranted sentencing disparity was an
unnecessary evil. Policymakers shared the perception that similarly situated offenders often received significantly different sentences, an obvious
consequence of judicial and parole discretion. Second, both sides
targeted uncertainty in sentencing, another consequence of indeterminate sentencing and parole release. They agreed that it should be replaced with "truth in sentencing," under which the term imposed would
actually be served, minus a modest amount of time off for good behavior.
Third, both conservatives and liberals agreed on the broad outlines of a
philosophical shift in the aims of sentencing. Both sides agreed that reha17
bilitation should be de-emphasized, although for different reasons.
Although some commentators urged that general deterrence should
be the guiding rationale of sentencing, more attention was focused on a
modernized version of retribution, or just deserts.18 Although there are
many different approaches to just deserts, at its most basic level it means
that sentencing decisions are based more on the circumstances of the offense, and perhaps the offender's criminal record, than on the offender's
individual characteristics. Conservatives favored this approach because it
was more manifestly punitive. Liberals, or at least some of them, believed
that offense-based sentencing would be fairer and less subject to bias.
So much for philosophy. The sentencing reform movement had to
develop mechanisms to replace or supplement the prevailing methods of
14. See Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 227 (describing liberal critiques of indeterminate sentencing and parole).
15. See id. (noting that sentencing discrepancies were "fundamentally at odds
with ideals of equality and the rule of the law").
16. See id. at 227-28 (considering growing academic literature criticizing indeterminate sentencing and parole).

17, See id. at 240 (providing that rehabilitation as sentencing goal was criticized by both conservatives and liberals).
18. See id. at 240 (offering proposed goals of punishment by various sentencing reformers). See generally NORvAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974)

(discussing failure of rehabilitation as imprisonment goal).
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sentencing offenders. Reforms proceeded in two distinct directions.
Some legislatures, in light of their unhappiness with the traditional sentencing system, enacted mandatory penalty schemes. Under those regimes, specific or minimum penalties are prescribed by statute for
violations of various laws. 19 There may be mandatory penalties covering a
wide range of offenses, as in California, or a more specific group of offenses, as in the federal system, where mandatory minimums basically apply to narcotics and weapons offenses. 20 New York's "Rockefeller Drug
Laws" 21 are an example of targeted mandatory sentencing statutes.
Another approach to implementing sentencing reform involved sentencing guidelines. Many reformers coalesced around the idea of having
an expert, independent administrative agency ofjudges, lawyers, criminal
justice officials and scholars, known as a sentencing commission, study sentencing and develop a set of guiding principles. These principles would
be reduced to a set of rules, or guidelines, which judges would be required
to follow in ordinary cases. Judges could, however, "depart" from the
guidelines in atypical cases. Parole would be abolished to ensure honesty
in sentencing. 22 With a body of rules to govern sentences, meaningful
appellate review would be available for the first time, leading to the development of a "common law of sentencing." 23 In the end, proponents of
the sentencing guideline approach hoped that the Sentencing Commission's expertise and insulation from political considerations would lead to
crucial improvements in sentencing.
In 1980, Minnesota became the first state to implement sentencing
guidelines, followed by Pennsylvania in 1982 and Washington in 1984.24
In 1984, Congress passed the landmark Sentencing Reform Act. 25 The
United States Sentencing Commission, established by the Sentencing Reform Act, promulgated its original guidelines in 1987. Today, sentencing
19. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Underminingthe Effectiveness of DeterminateSentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 62 (1993) (discussing legis-

latures' enactment of mandatory sentencing laws that require significantly
enhanced punishment in large number of felony prosecutions).
20. See id. (noting cases where mandatory minimums would apply, such as
felony prosecutions involving violent crimes and drug trafficking).
21. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-65, 221.00-5 (McKinney 2005).

22. See Douglas A. Berman, Balancedand PurposefulDepartures:Fixing aJurisprudence That Undermines the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 21, 36

(2000) (referring to bill calling for abolition of parole in addition to creation of
federal sentencing commission and guidelines).
23. See Adam Lamparello, Introducingthe "HeartlandDeparture,"27 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 643, 646-67 (2004) (describing role of appellate courts under federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
24. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. (West 1992) (discussing first implementation of sentencing guidelines in Minnesota in 1978); see also 42 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. § 9721 (West 1990) (discussing initial sentencing guidelines effective in
Pennsylvania in 1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030 (West 1999) (discussing
Washington's first sentencing guideline system in 1984).
25. For an excellent review of the development of the Sentencing Reform
Act, see Stith & Koh, supra note 6, at 223.
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guidelines are in effect in over twenty states and the federal system, and a
number of additional states have sentencing commissions at work.
Sentencing guidelines vary in important ways. The federal Sentencing Guidelines are extremely complex. They severely restrict the ability of
judges to consider individual offender characteristics, often require
sentences to be based on alleged offenses of which the defendant was not
convicted and barely consider nonimprisonment sentences. 26 The various
state guidelines are generally simpler and more flexible than the federal
model. Although they differ on such issues as whether the guidelines are
binding or advisory, the ease with which judges may depart from the
guidelines, the extent to which they regulate nonprison sentences and
whether parole was abolished, state guidelines have been much more
27
readily accepted.
Although the Apprendi line of cases came as a great surprise, there has
long been a vigorous debate about the procedures and standards of proof
that should apply at sentencing. As noted above, one significant goal of
sentencing reformers was making sentencing fairer. Until 2000, the Supreme Court took a very hands-off approach to procedural and substantive
fairness issues in sentencing. Thatjurisprudence was both highly deferential to legislative choices and very tolerant of procedural informality. 28 In
traditional sentencing regimes, before the introduction of the Sentencing
Guidelines, legislatures could decide, with few limits, which facts were elements of offenses and which were sentencing factors. Within typically
broad statutory ranges, judges could rely on almost any facts of their
choosing in selecting the sentence to be imposed. Such facts, which did
not need to be determined by more than a preponderance of the evidence, could be about the offense or the offender.
As discretionary sentencing systems began to give way to more structured approaches, there was renewed attention to the process of determining sentencing facts. Sentencing guidelines systems have introduced more
due process and applied more refined legal principles to sentencing. For
example, judges in sentencing guidelines systems (other than the loosest
advisory guidelines) must apply previously established rules rather than
simply relying on their own instincts or philosophies. Contested factual
issues are often the subject of hearings, and decisions of the sentencing
judge are subject to appellate review. Still, the Supreme Court continued
to approve of a preponderance of the evidence standard. 29 Critics argued
26. See Ronald F. Wright, Making Sense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Complexity and Distrust in Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 617, 617 (1992)

(observing complaints about complexity of federal Sentencing Guidelines).
27. See id. at 620 (acknowledging difference between federal and state sentencing systems, which often results in more complexities).
28. The leading Supreme Court case of this era was Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949) (holding that defendants did not have right to confront or crossexamine witnesses against them at sentencing).
29. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 92 (1986), for example, the
Court upheld a provision mandating a five-year minimum sentence if the judge
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that with the heightened importance and formality of fact finding in
guidelines systems, this approach was inadequate to protect defendants'
due process rights. 30 Prior to Apprendi, though, the Supreme Court
showed little inclination to overturn its past, deferential approach to sen31
tencing fairness.
III.

APPRENDI, RING, HARRs, BLAKELY

To understand Blakely, it is appropriate to begin with Apprendi, a 2000
Supreme Court decision. 32 In Apprendi, the defendant pleaded guilty to a
weapons offense with a statutory maximum punishment of ten years imprisonment. A separate statute authorized increasing the maximum to
twenty years if the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant was motivated by racial animus.3 3 After finding this animus, the judge sentenced Apprendi to prison for twelve years.3 4 The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, ruled that "any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."3 5 The dissent argued that established precedent allowed sentence enhancements of
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of enumerated offenses.
30. See Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, The Offense of
Conviction, and the Limited Role of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 870-71 (2004)
(considering findings of fact in sentencing determined by preponderance of evidence rather than beyond reasonable doubt standard as "sentencing factor" in
McMillan).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149-53 (1997) (arguing that
because of different standard of proof at sentencing, guidelines permissibly require judges to consider acquitted conduct); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,
399-400 (1995) (concluding that double jeopardy was not violated by prosecution
for conduct that had been used to enhance defendant's sentence in prior case).
32. Apprendi did not arrive out of thin air. Justice Scalia planted the seeds for
this decision with his dissents in Monge v. California,524 U.S. 721 (1998), and Almendaraz-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (enhancement of defendant's
sentence for prior convictions does not require jury finding beyond reasonable
doubt as to those prior convictions). In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6
(1999), the Court interpreted the federal carjacking statute in a manner to avoid
having to reach the constitutional issue, but suggested that, other than prior convictions, a fact that "increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
For a further discussion of these cases, see Jon Wool, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely
v. Washington; Legal Considerationsfor State Sentencing Systems, POL'Y & PRAc. REV.
(Vera Inst. of Justice, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2004, at 3-6, available at http://www.
vera.org/publication-pdf/250_477.pdf.
33. See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 470 (2000) (reviewing enhancement findings by judge regarding sentence maximums).
34. See id. at 466 (finding Apprendi guilty by preponderance of evidence that
shooting was racially motivated, thereby sentencing Apprendi to twelve year term
on firearms count).
35. Id. at 490.
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this sort and worried that the majority's rationale could be extended far
36
beyond the narrow situation presented in Apprendi.
Two years later, the Court applied the Apprendi rule in a way that foreshadowed Blakely in Ring v. Arizona.37 The defendant in Ring was con-

victed of felony murder, an offense for which the death penalty was
available. Under Arizona's statutory scheme, though, the judge could only
sentence a defendant to death after finding certain enumerated aggravating factors at a sentencing hearing. 38 After finding an aggravating circumstance at the sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced Ring to death. The
Supreme Court applied Apprendi broadly, ruling that if a "State makes an
increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found
39
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."
In hindsight, Blakely was probably the inevitable result of Ring, although at the time, most experts did not expect the Court to follow
through in this manner. 40 The defendant in Blakely was charged with firstdegree kidnapping after abducting his wife. He pleaded guilty to seconddegree kidnapping, an offense punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. Washington's Sentencing Reform Act ("Act") set the normal range
for this offense at forty-nine to fifty-three months imprisonment. 41 Under
the Act, the judge could only exceed fifty-three months upon finding a
"substantial and compelling reason." 42 After finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty," the judge
43
sentenced him to ninety months.
The Supreme Court, by the same five to four majority that decided
Apprendi, ruled that this procedure was unconstitutional. According to the
Court, under Apprendi, the "prescribed statutory maximum" that triggers
Sixth Amendment rights is "the maximum sentence that a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

36. See id. at 525 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
38. See id. (discussing Arizona sentencing scheme).
39. See id. at 602 (relying on Apprendi in striking down death sentence).
40. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at

ExtendingApprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15

FED. SENTENCING REP. 79,

81 (2002)

(discussing contemporaneous belief that Apprendi will pose no future threat to validity of discretionary sentencing guidelines); NancyJ. King & Susan R. Klein, Appros Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331, 338 (2000) (arguing that only lasting
impact of Apprendi will be its effect on "legislative efforts to draft crimes and punishments in its wake, and.., constitutional limits on the shape of substantive criminal
law"). Blakely's attorney, a young law firm associate, saw the case as an easy one
after Apprendi and Ring, using only twenty-five of the fifty page limit in his brief. See
David Feige, The Supreme Beginner, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at 18.
41. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2534-35 (2004) (discussing
Washington's sentencing scheme).
42. Id. (quoting WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.310(3)(b) (West 2003)).
43. See id. (recounting facts).
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defendant."44 Because the defendant's "deliberate cruelty" was not part of
the statutory definition of the offense, and the defendant made no such
admission, his sentence could be raised above the normal range only upon
a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court did not view the
distinction between the formal statutory maximum in Apprendi and the
functional equivalent of the normal range in Blakely to be constitutionally
45
significant.
Blakely sent shockwaves through the federal criminal justice system.
As the case made clear, both the federal Sentencing Guidelines and other
state guidelines sharing many of the attributes of Washington's system
might be invalid.4 6 The lower federal courts quickly split on the question, 47 and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the issue promptly. On the
first day of the new term, less than three months after deciding Blakely, the
Court heard arguments in United States v. Booker 48 and United States v.
49
Fanfan.
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court announced its decision.
The same five member majority from Apprendi and Blakely dismissed the
government's efforts to distinguish the federal Sentencing Guidelines, ruling that the Sixth Amendment was violated by the guidelines' mandatory
enhancement of sentencing ranges based on facts not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury or admitted by the defendant. 50 The Court
rejected the government's argument that the federal guidelines, written by
an administrative agency to constrain judicial discretion, were distinguish5 1
able from Washington's statutory guidelines.
44. Id. at 2537 (emphasis added).
45. See id. at 2538 (rebutting state's argument).
46. The Blakely majority expressly noted that the status of the federal Sentencing Guidelines was not then before the Court. See id. at 2538 n.9 (passing up opportunity to rule on federal guidelines). The dissent, though, predicted that there
were no constitutionally significant differences between Washington's system and
the federal guidelines. See id. at 2549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The structure of
the Federal Guidelines likewise does not, as the Government half-heartedly suggests, provide any grounds for distinction ....
If anything, the structural differences that do exist make the Federal Guidelines more vulnerable to attack.").
47. See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004), affd, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005) (refusing to grant upward departure mandated by federal Sentencing Guidelines after Blakely); Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114,
at *3 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), vacated by, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738
(2005) (adhering to federal guidelines after Blakely).
48. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2004), affd, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005).
49. No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), vacated by, United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
50. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 754-55 (refusing to distinguish Blakely system from
federal guidelines).
51. See id. at 753 ("Regardless of whether the legal basis of the accusation is in
a statute or in guidelines promulgated by an independent commission, the principles behind the jury trial are equally applicable.").
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The Court then turned to the appropriate remedy for its finding that
the federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional. Here, a different five-four majority52 ruled that the remedy most in keeping with congressional intent was to strike those statutory provisions that made the
guidelines mandatory. 53 The remaining provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act now direct judges to "consider" the applicable sentencing guideline range, along with a number of other factors, such as "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de54
fendant," and the "need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
The guidelines are therefore advisory, rather than mandatory. Appellate
courts can continue to hear appeals of sentences, with the applicable stan55
dard of review being "reasonableness."
The dissent to this part of the decision complained vigorously that the
Court was improperly engaging in judicial legislation. 5 6 They complained
that the Court was invalidating statutory provisions that neither party had
challenged. 5 7 Instead, they argued, the Court should "simply allow the
Government to continue doing what it has done since this Court handed
down Blakely-prove any fact that is requiredto increase a defendant's sen58
tence under the Guidelines to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."
It is far too soon to comment meaningfully on the precise nature of
the post-Booker federal sentencing system. Several important issues are already apparent. The most significant is the role the guidelines will play in
their new "advisory" capacity. The guidelines no longer carry the formal
force of law. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, with the excisions made
by the Court in Booker, the judge is under no compulsion to sentence
within the guidelines range. The judge must "consider" the guidelines, as
well as the various purposes of sentencing set forth in the statute. This
structure has already led some sentencing judges to conclude that
sentences below the guidelines range are appropriate because, for example, the guidelines' restrictions on the consideration of personal characteristics conflict with a federal statute. 59 This sort of decision treats the
guidelines as in fact advisory.
52. Justice Ginsburgjoined the four dissenters from the first part of the ruling. See id. at 756 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
53. See id. at 756-57 (striking down relevant portions of statute).
54. Id. at 759 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2005)).
55. See id. at 757 (articulating new standard of review for sentencing).
56. See id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("While it is clear that Congress
has ample power to repeal these two statutory provisions ... this Court should not
make that choice on Congress' behalf."); see also id. at 789-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing "remedial majority's" analysis).
57. See id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's severability
analysis constitutes "entirely new law").
58. Id. at 779.
59. See United States v. Myers, No. 3:03-CR-147, 2005 WL 165314, at *6 (S.D.
Iowa Jan. 26, 2005) (sentencing defendant to probation when guideline range was
twenty to thirty months imprisonment); United States v. Ranum, No. 04-CR-31,
2005 WL 161223, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2005) (sentencing defendant to impris-
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On the other hand, some courts are still giving enormous deference
to the guidelines. In a decision announced the day after Booker was decided, Judge Paul Cassell concluded that he was still bound to impose a
sentence within the applicable guidelines range in all but the most unusual cases. 60 Thus, we are likely to see very different approaches to the
weight given to the guidelines in an advisory system. As a result, it is impossible to predict how often judges will sentence within the recommended guidelines range. It seems fair to say that sentences deviating
from the guidelines will increase, perhaps substantially, from the time
when the guidelines had the force of law. Also, it is likely that there will be
large inter-judge and inter-region differences in approaches to the
guidelines.

IV.

THE COMING DEBATE ABOUT FEDERAL SENTENCING

A.

Legislative Options

Now that the Supreme Court has invalidated the mandatory nature of
the existing federal Sentencing Guidelines (and, presumably, the guidelines and some nonguideline systems in a number of states),61 it is up to
Congress to decide what to do next. 62 There exists a wide range of plausible legislative responses, some of which could be used in combination.
These options fall into three categories, which can be characterized
broadly as abandonment, evasion and compliance.
1.

Abandonment

First, Congress could abandon sentencing guidelines that have the
force of law. One way to do this would be by repealing sentencing guidelines
and returning to a system of unguided judicial discretion. Although it might
onment of one year and one day when guideline range was thirty-seven to forty-six
months); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2004) ("No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.").
60. See United States v. Wilson, No. 2:03-CR-00882 PGC, 2005 WL 273168, at
*15 (D. Utah Feb. 2, 2005) (concluding that "court... will give heavy weight to the
Guidelines when determining a sentence").
61. CompareJon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington-PracticalImplicationsfor State Sentencing Systems, POL'Y & PiAc. REV. (Vera
Inst. ofJustice, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.vera.org/
publication.pdf/250_477.pdf (noting states "fundamentally" affected by Blakely,
and now Booker, are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota,
NewJersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington), with NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, Blakely v. Washington: Implicationsfor
State Courts, (July 16, 2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publica
tions/KIS_.SentenBlakely.pdf (listing potentially affected states as Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee and Washington).
62. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) ("Ours, of
course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress's court.").
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seem ironic given the Supreme Court's concern with the role of the jury in
the Apprendi line of cases, there is apparently nothing constitutionally suspect about the traditional sentencing system. 63 The Court has clearly
noted its concern with the process of finding facts that increase the effective maximum punishment to which the defendant is exposed. In the
traditional system, the judge has discretion to sentence up to the statutory
maximum; thus, there is no Apprendi problem. As the likelihood of this
being Congress's preferred option seems to be between slim and none, I
will not dwell on it.
Another form of abandonment would be replacing the guidelines with
mandatory minimum statutory penalties. Mandatory minimum provisions are

unaffected by the Apprendi line of cases because the penalty is established
by the fact of conviction of a particular offense. Broadly criticized as
overly rigid and severe, mandatory minimums retain appeal for many in
Congress. 64 As discussed below, mandatory minimums are the crudest,
least principled form of sentencing available. 65 Although Congress may
well enact additional mandatory minimums, it would be impossible for
such a structure to serve as the meaningful foundation of a sentencing
system given the broad reach of many federal criminal statutes.
The status quo created by the Supreme Court in Booker can be considered another form of abandonment: keeping the guidelines, but as voluntary
or advisory, rather than binding. Even before Booker, this option had been

proposed. 6 6 A number of jurisdictions have voluntary or advisory sentencing guidelines. 67 In these systems, there is no obligation for the judge to
sentence within the range recommended by the guidelines, and usually no
right of appeal. 68 Of course, after Booker, the federal system involves advisory guidelines with appellate review of sentences for "unreasonable63. See id. at 750 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). "For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts the judge deems relevant."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
64. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 199, 200-02 (1993) (discussing pervasiveness of mandatory minimums
in sentencing legislation). "[T]he federal code contains 100 separate mandatory
minimum sentence provisions, located in sixty different statutes." Id. at 201.
65. For a discussion of mandatory minimums, see infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAwYERs, United States Sentencing Guidelines
2004: An Experiment That Has Failed 35 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.actl.
com/pdfs/SentencingGuidelines_3.pdf (advocating replacement of binding
guidelines with advisory system).
67. See Wool & Stemen, supra note 61, at 3 (listing Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah and Virginia as jurisdictions with voluntary sentencing
systems that are possibly affected by Blakely). The District of Columbia, Louisiana,
Missouri and Wisconsin are listed as jurisdictions not affected by Blakely. See id.
. 68. See id. at 5 (describing voluntary systems). "[Voluntary] systems are similar in structure to the Washington Guidelines in that they prescribe a range of
sentences for each offense or offense class, but they differ in that the ranges are not
expressly binding." Id. (emphasis added).
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ness." 69 The value in advisory guidelines is giving judges meaningful
guidance, requiring them to consider the collective judgment embodied
in the guidelines and explain their decisions to deviate and, at least in the
model created in Booker, incorporating appellate review as a tool for correcting outlier sentences. The weaknesses of advisory guidelines are inherent in their flexibility. With no requirement that judges comply with any
sentencing rules, individual sentences may vary widely. It seems unlikely
that appellate review for "unreasonableness" will provide a meaningful
control mechanism. In an important respect, advisory guidelines represent even greater judicial power in determining sentences. In the
traditional system, the Parole Commission had a leveling effect on judicial
discretion. In the current post-Booker system, we have broad judicial discretion combined with determinate sentences.
2.

Evasion

Another category of responses would be to evade the requirement of
jury determination of aggravating factors. Apprendi, Blakely and Booker do
not require ajury finding of a sentencing fact unless the fact increases the
effective maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed. 70 Congress could evade this requirement, while keeping the current guideline
system in place, by increasing the top of each guideline range to the statutory
maximum. 71 The guidelines calculation would effectively determine a
point that would serve as the minimum of the applicable sentencing
range. These so-called "topless guidelines" would comply with Booker because the offense or offenses of conviction-not any additional factual
72
findings-would determine the upper limit of the sentencing range.
69. For a discussion of the holding in Booker, see supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
70. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (holding that jury
must find facts that cause sentences to exceed maximum authorized); Blakely v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004) (stating that Sixth Amendment is only
implicated when "a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not
allow"); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to ajury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
71. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Memorandum Presentinga Proposalfor Bringing the
FederalSentencing Guidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 364, 367 (2004) (proposing "topless guidelines"). "I believe that the
Guidelines structure can be preserved essentially unchanged with a simple modification-amend the sentencing ranges on the Chapter5 Sentencing Table to increasethe top
of each guidelines range to the statutory maximum of the offense(s) of conviction." Id.
72. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (concluding that only facts found by jury may
increase sentence beyond maximum allowed). It is important to note, however,
that the constitutionality of "topless guidelines" depends on the continued vitality
of United States v. Harris,536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (holding that two-year increase
in defendant's minimum sentence on judicial finding does not evade Fifth and
Sixth Amendment requirements). In Harris, the Supreme Court ruled-in another five-four decision-that the rule from Apprendi does not apply to the setting
of the minimum, as opposed to the maximum, of a sentencing range. See Harris,
536 U.S. at 567-68 (addressing impact of Apprendi on minimum sentences). As a
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This is apparently the option favored by the Department of Jus73
tice.
To proponents, the principal advantage of "topless guidelines" is that
they would require few changes in the federal Sentencing Guidelines as
they existed before Booker. Judges would be required to make the same
determinations as they always have under the guidelines, and there would
be no need to resort to juries. The resulting sentencing ranges would, of
course, be greatly increased on the upper ends. There probably would not
be a dramatic increase in harsher sentences, however, because mostjudges
have previously imposed sentences at or below the bottom of the applicable ranges. Opponents respond that a system that only regulates the lower
end of sentences, and where there is no parole mechanism to regulate
sentence length, is irrational, unfair and invites disparity.7 4 If even ten
percent of sentences are imposed above the current guidelines, with no
effective method of regulation, sentencing consistency would suffer
greatly. 75 It is also important to note that the constitutionality of "topless
76
guidelines" depends on the continued vitality of United States v. Harris.
In Harris,the Supreme Court ruled, in another five-four decision, that the
rule from Apprendi does not apply to the setting of the minimum, as opposed to the maximum, of a sentencing range. However, Justice Breyer,
one of the Harrismajority, recognized that this rule was not really consistent with the logic of Apprendi and suggested that the issue might be reconmember of the Harris majority, Justice Breyer recognized that this rule was not
really consistent with the logic of Apprendi and suggested that the issue might be
reconsidered if Apprendi (from which he vigorously dissented) remained law. See
id. at 569-72 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating Sixth Amendment permits judges to
apply sentencing factors when those factors lead to application of mandatory

minimum).
73. See The Future of Federal Sentencing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 10-12
(Nov. 17, 2004) (statement of Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't ofJustice), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/ll
_16_04/Wray-testimony.pdf (stating "there appear to be many advantages to the
[topless guidelines] proposal").
74. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY LJ.

(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with author) (topless guidelines "would
likely re-inject into the federal sentencing system excessive unregulated discretion
that would, at a minimum, result in dangerous outliers"); see also Ass'N OF FED. DEF.
Arro-.Evs, Online Presentation: Blakely Updates (Nov. 22, 2004), at http://www.
afda.org/afda/news/outline BlakelyChat.pdf (discussing issues of unfairness that
topless guidelines pose to defense bar). " [J]udges will have flexibility to give much
longer sentences than the guidelines would otherwise have allowed, up to the statutory maximum, WITHOUT HAVING TO JUSTIFY AN UPWARD DEPARTURE."
Id.
75. See Chanenson, supra note 74, at 47 (discussing how topless guidelines
increase individualization of sentences and cause decrease in proportionality). It
would be possible to combine topless guidelines and parole release to guard
against unduly severe sentences. See id. at 62-65 (proposing system of indeterminate structured sentencing). Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines follow this
model. See id. at 66-68 (explaining Pennsylvania's basic sentencing structure).
76. 536 U.S. 545 (2002). For a discussion of the holding in Harris, see supra
note 72.
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sidered if Apprendi (from which he vigorously dissented) remained law. If
the Court reverses Harris,a system of "topless guidelines" would have to be
replaced, again disrupting the federal sentencing system.
Another method of evading Booker while maintaining sentencing
guidelines would be to turn all aggravatingfactors into mitigatingfactors.7 7 In
this system, the only fact-finding necessary would result in lowering, rather
than increasing, the defendant's possible punishment. Therefore, this
fact-finding could presumably be done by the judge on a preponderance
of the evidence standard. In that sense, it shares the same "virtue" as "topless guidelines." A presumptive sentence, however, at the statutory maximum-with the burden of proof on the defense for any reduction-is a
rather perverse form of sentencing reform. Currently, there do not appear to be any strong advocates of this approach.
3.

Compliance

Finally, Congress could establish a system that complies with Booker's
model of jury consideration of aggravating facts in a binding guideline
system. The existing Sentencing Guidelines, or a modified version, could
be as fully mandatory as in the past if Congress authorized the use ofjuries
to find any disputed facts necessary to increase the guidelines' base offense levels. Kansas made such a change to its sentencing guidelines system after Apprendi,78 and other states are considering similar efforts. 7 9
B.

What Should Congress Do?

There is no need for immediate action. The system in place after
Booker is stable. Sentences will be imposed and can be appealed. Even if it
is a viable or desirable system in the long run, the risks of rash congressional action are great. Congress might make unwise, or even unconstitutional choices, necessitating further disruptive changes in the near future.
Congress should set a time period for evaluating the current system-nine
months to a year makes sense-and work closely with the Sentencing
Commission, the Department ofJustice, the federal judiciary, the defense
77. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2558 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
78. See State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001) (holding state's sentencing scheme unconstitutional under Sixth Amendment). This Kansas Supreme
Court decision preceded the rulings in Blakely and Booker. The Kansas legislature
promptly enacted legislation requiring disputed aggravating facts to be "presented
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt during the trial of the matter or
following the determination of the defendant's innocence or guilt." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4718(b) (2) (2005).

79. See, e.g.,
MINN.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N,

The Impact of Blakely v.

Washington on Sentencing in Minnesota: Long Term Recommendations 16-17 (Sept. 30,
2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Data%20Reports/blakely-long
tenn.pdf, reprinted in 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 146, 153 (2004) (proposing that
juries be required "to reach a unanimous decision on the presence of aggravating
factors for an aggravated departure sentence to be imposed").
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bar and scholars to plan the contours of such an evaluation. At the same
time, Congress can be examining alternative systems if it elects to replace
the current one.
As Congress contemplates what, if anything, to do in the wake of
Booker, the most important thing is to engage in an open, searching evalua-

tion of the current system and future options. In this sense, Booker provides an unparalleled opportunity. The first serious reconsideration of
federal sentencing policy in Congress since passage of the Sentencing Reform Act is likely in the wake of Booker. Although Congress has enacted
numerous pieces of individual sentencing legislation over the years, it has
not seriously examined the sentencing system and its many flaws. 80 Such
an examination is long overdue, and can help provide a roadmap for the
most sensible response to Booker.
81
The federal Sentencing Guidelines have been in effect since 1987.
Supporters of the system contend that the guidelines have led to more
certain, consistent sentences. 82 The many critics of the guidelines, and I
80. See Schulhofer, supra note 64, at 200-02 (discussing federal sentencing
legislation since 1984). Most importantly, Congress has enacted a number of
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-971 (2000)) (establishing numerous mandatory minimum sentences); see
Schulhofer, supra note 64, at 201 (noting enactment of numerous mandatory minimums for drug offenses). Congress has also been increasingly willing to
micromanage the Sentencing Guidelines by requiring the Sentencing Commission
to increase some ranges, directly increasing the guidelines by statute, overturning
Sentencing Commission amendments to the guidelines that reduced the disparity
in treatment of crack and powder cocaine and reducing some money laundering
sentences. See generally David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The
Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REv. 211 (2004)
(discussing Congress's influence on federal Sentencing Guidelines). Finally, the
"Feeney Amendment," among its other aims, sought to significantly reduce the
frequency of downward departures from the guidelines. See United States v. Kahn,
325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3 7 42(g) (2004))
("The Feeney Amendment, among other unsound innovations, prohibits a downward departure unless the ground for departure was relied upon in the previous
sentencing and approved by the court of appeals.").
81. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Guidelines Manual § 1A.1 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (noting that guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987). A number
of lower courts soon declared them to be unconstitutional, generally on separation
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1268 (9th
of powers grounds. See, e.g.,
Cir. 1988) (affirming district court conclusion that Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional), vacated by United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989).
In early 1989, the Supreme Court rejected these challenges, and upheld the guidelines. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (concluding that
guidelines are constitutional).
82. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Fifteen Years of Sentencing: An Assessment of
How Well the Federal CriminalJustice System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform
138-39 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Fifteen Year Report], available at http://www.ussc.
gov/15_year/15year.htm (noting goal of certainty of punishment "has been most
fully achieved"). There are, in fact, few favorable scholarly reviews of the guidelines. One of the more prominent supporters of the guidelines has, more recently,

declared them to be a failure. Compare Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy
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count myself as one, 83 focus on the issues of complexity, rigidity, procedural and substantive unfairness and severity. These criticisms are interrelated and shed light on the available options after Booker.

C.

Rigidity

At the outset, it is important to note that a number of the worst aspects of the federal sentencing system are the result of mandatory minimum statutes. 84 Mandatory minimums are fundamentally at odds with the
goal of striking a reasonable balance between judicial discretion and consistency. 85 Mandatory minimums are overly severe, result from whatever
crime has captured Congress's attention at that moment and shift enormous sentencing discretion to prosecutors. They contribute enormously
to the federal sentencing system's rigidity and severity. This does not excuse the flaws of the Sentencing Guidelines, which in some ways make the
mandatory minimums worse. Instead, any sensible review of current sentencing policy should reject the continued use of mandatory minimums.
A major additional source of the guidelines' rigidity is the so-called
"25% Rule." In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress directed the Sentencing Commission that, except at the lowest sentence levels, the top of a
guideline range could be no more than twenty-five percent greater than
the bottom. 8 6 Once the guidelines calculations are complete, the sentencing judge has quite limited input into the exact sentence, at least until a
Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679, 680 (1996) ("[The Guidelines] are, at worst, a marked
improvement over the system they replaced .... "), with Frank 0. Bowman, III, The
Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REv.
(forthcoming May 2005).
83. See, e.g., David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing
and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403 (1993) (criticizing guidelines on numerous grounds); David Yellen, Just Deserts and Lenient Prosecutors: The
Flawed Casefor Real-Offense Sentencing, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1434 (1997) [hereinafter
Yellen, Just Deserts] (same); David Yellen, Little Progress in FederalSentencing After Ten
Years of Guidelines,8 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1 (1997) (same); David Yellen, WhatJuve-

nile Court Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 Wis. L.
REv. 577 (1996) (same).
84. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Special Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter
Mandatory Minimum Report], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/MAN
MIN.PDF (providing thorough and devastating evaluation of mandatory minimum
penalties).
85. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 134 (1996) ("The greatest gap

between knowledge and policy in American sentencing concerns mandatory
penalties.").
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (2004) ("If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for
such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater
of 25 percent or 6 months .... ").
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sentence is in one of the highest sentencing ranges.8 7 The goal was to
fairly and narrowly constrain judicial discretion, but Congress erred in several respects. First, it overshot the mark. A range of twenty-five percent,
particularly for offenders at lower severity levels, simply does not provide
enough room for reasonable differentiation of sentences. Second, in order to have such narrow sentencing ranges covering everything from zero
months imprisonment to life imprisonment, the Sentencing Commission
had to develop an inordinately detailed sentencing table. 88 The fortythree levels of the sentencing table are a major factor in the overly complex nature of the guidelines, as discussed below.
Rigidity or flexibility is a function of two factors: the amount of discretion judges have within the guidelines and the extent of their ability to
deviate or depart from the guidelines. Faced with the severe limitations
on in-guideline discretion imposed by the sentencing table's twenty-five
percent rule, federal judges have increasingly sought to depart from the
guidelines. The "departure rate" from the guidelines increased steadily in
the first fifteen years of the guidelines. 89 Congress responded to this increased exercise of judicial discretion by significantly restricting departures in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"). 90
D.

Complexity

The federal Sentencing Guidelines are far more detailed and complex than any state guideline system. Two fundamental decisions of the
Sentencing Commission explain this and both are related to the Sentencing Commission's embrace of "real offense sentencing.' 9 1 First, for all of87. See Mandatoy Minimum Report, supra note 84, at 24 ("As sentence exposure
increases at the higher offense levels, the twenty-five percent within-range differential can result in considerable latitude for judges.").
88. See U.S.S.G., supra note 81, app. G (2003) (providing sentencing table).
89. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, Report to the Congress: Downward Departures
from the FederalSentencing Guidelines 32 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter Downward Departure
Report], available at www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrptO3.pdf (graphing steady
increase in downward departures). The rate of downward departures-for reasons
other than the government filing a motion addressing the defendant's "substantial
assistance" in the investigation or prosecution of another-increased from 5.8 percent in 1991 to 18.1 percent in 2001. See id. at 31 (discussing trends in downward
departures).
90. See Pub. L. 108-21, §§ 401(a), (c), (j) (5), 117 Stat. 667, 669, 673 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2004)) (restricting availability of downward departures in Sentencing Guidelines).
91. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1988) (noting Sentencing Commission's compromise between "'real offense' sentencing system and 'charge offense' system"). Justice Breyer, an original member of the Sentencing
Commission, explained and defended the guidelines' incorporation of "modified
real offense sentencing." Id. at 8-12. There are a few scholarly analyses favorable
to real offense sentencing. But see Yellen, Just Deserts, supra note 83, at 1439-40
(responding to Professor Sullivan by arguing "alleged-related offense sentencing
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fenses, the Commission chose not to rely on the statutory offense of
conviction to determine the sentencing range. To some extent, this was
understandable. The statutory offense of conviction often tells less about
the nature and severity of the defendant's conduct in the federal system
than in the states. State criminal codes tend to be more developed and
coherent than the federal criminal statutes, and differences in offense se92
Further, many federal
verity are more often defined by state statutes.
criminal prosecutions involve statutes covering a wide range of conduct. A
conviction for mail fraud or racketeering-which can itself be based on
mail fraud-does not tell nearly as much about the nature of the offense
as a conviction for manslaughter or burglary.
Still, the Sentencing Commission attempted to do much more than
simply introduce some rational distinction among offenses and develop
special rules for umbrella-like federal statutes. The guidelines attempt to
identify and assign a value to most of the harms that occur from an offense. Through the many "specific offense characteristics" in the Chapter
2 offense guidelines and the Chapter 3 adjustments, the federal Sentencing Guidelines strive for a sentencing system based on a detailed version of
the offense.
Second, and most controversially, the guidelines calculate the sentencing range for important categories of federal offenses based in part on
offenses for which the defendant has not been convicted. In drug, fraud
and other types of cases, the court must include in the guidelines other
alleged offenses that were "of the same course of conduct or common
93
In addition to being descheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
monstrably unfair, this provision contributes greatly to the guidelines'
complexity.9 4 It is also unwise. Assuming that the relevant conduct rules
are aimed at assessing the defendant's 'just deserts," they focus too narrowly. A measure ofjust deserts should consist of both harm and culpability. The guidelines largely ignore culpability by rejecting factors such as
youth that judges have traditionally relied on to mitigate punishment.
Also, the offender's role in the offense, which should be of paramount
importance, is given a relatively modest and constrained role.

reflects an unduly narrow focus on eliminating disparity"). See generally Julie R.
O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines'ModifiedReal-Offense System, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1342 (1997) (advocating real offense system and criticizing charge
offense system).
92. One cannot really speak meaningfully of a federal criminal code. Instead,
we have a hodgepodge of four thousand or so criminal statutes scattered throughout the United States Code, often using different terminology.
93. U.S.S.G., supra note 81, § 1B1.3(a)(2).
94. For a discussion of how the relevant conduct provisions are unfair, see
infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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Unfairness

Criticisms of the federal Sentencing Guidelines on fairness grounds
have both procedural and substantive components. Some have complained that because the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines provide very few procedures, there is disparity in the approaches judges
take.9 5 Some judges fairly routinely hold sentencing evidentiary hearings;
others rarely do. Approaches to hearsay evidence also vary widely. Consistency aside, it was also argued before Apprendi that a preponderance of the
evidence standard was constitutionally inadequate, at least in cases where
96
the sentencing fact-finding has a dramatic effect on the sentence.
The greatest complaints about the substantive unfairness of the federal guidelines involve the guidelines' real offense sentencing or "relevant
conduct." 97 No other sentencing system in the world mandates that
sentences be increased based on alleged additional offenses for which the
defendant has not been convicted. This additional alleged criminal conduct, for which the defendant even may have been acquitted, counts just
as much in the guidelines as the conduct for which the defendant was
convicted. As I have argued elsewhere, the system is almost grotesquely
unfair, and does not accomplish much of what the Sentencing Commission believed it would. 9 8
F.

Severity

Whether a sentencing system achieves sanctions of appropriate severity is, of course, not a matter that can be empirically determined. It is
clear, however, that the current federal system is far more severe than the
pre-reformed federal system, and many, if not most, federal judges find
the sentences they are compelled to impose to be too harsh in too many
cases. 9 9 Overly severe sentences can also lead to manipulation and evasion, which undercut the goals of reform.
95. See Susan N. Herman, ProceduralDue Process in Guidelines Sentencing,4 FED.
REP. 295, 295 (1992) (arguing that absence of clear procedural guidance has caused disparity).
96. See Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding
Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.CAL. L. REv.
289, 291 (1992) (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)) (noting
burden of proof for sentencing facts as preponderance of evidence).
97. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 161, 208-20 (1991) (discussing ability of sentencing
judges to sentence offenders for relevant conduct on preponderance of evidence);
see also Herman, supra note 96, at 299 (arguing that adoption of modified realoffense system with bifurcated fact-finding was "irrational").
98. For a discussion of the real offense aspects of the guidelines, see supra
notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
99. See Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Kennedy Speech], at www.supremecourtus.
gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html ("Our resources are misspent, our
punishments too severe, our sentences too long."). In the area of drug sentencing,
even many federal prosecutors are apparently uneasy with sentence severity. See
SENTENCING
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In 2002, the federal prison system became the nation's largest, surpassing California, with over 175,000 inmates. 10 0 This dramatic change is
the result of a much greater percentage of federal offenders being sentenced to imprisonment than before the guidelines and a doubling of the
average time served. 10 ' Diverse segments of the federal judiciary have expressed dissatisfaction with the severity of the current federal sentencing
system. ' 0 2 Justice Anthony Kennedy made headlines and spawned the creation of an American Bar Association commission that bears his name with
an August 2003 speech in which he declared that federal sentences were
often too severe and called for a downward revision in the Sentencing
Guidelines and reconsideration of mandatory minimum penalties. 10 3 Several federal judges have resigned from the bench, or declined to hear
criminal cases, to protest the rigidity and severity of federal sentencing
policy. 10 4 On an individual case level, judges have increasingly opted to
sentence defendants at the bottom of the applicable sentencing range or
have chosen to depart below the guidelines. 10 5 On the other hand, they
10 6
rarely depart above the guidelines range.
Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of
Declining FederalDrug Sentences IncludingDatafrom the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REv.
477, 559 (2002) ("prosecutors, and the judges they appear before, use their discretion liberally, but irregularly, to reduce drug sentences").
100. Fifteen Year Report, supra note 82, at 40. This represents a six-fold increase
in federal inmates from when there were 24,363 in 1980. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, Bulletin: Prisonersin 1994 1 (Aug. 1995), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pi94.pdf (highlighting number of federal inmates from 1980-1994).
101. SeeFifteen Year Report, supra note 82, at 46 ("Average prison time for federal offenders more than doubled after implementation of the guidelines."); id. at
43 (detailing drop in federal sentences to probation from one-half of all sentences
in 1984 to below ten percent in 2002).
102. See generally David M. Zlotnick, Shouting into the Wind: District CourtJudges
and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 645 (2004) (providing
excellent survey and analysis of'judicial attitudes toward federal sentencing levels).
103. See Kennedy Speech, supra note 99 ("The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
should be revised downward. By contrast to the Guidelines, I can accept neither
the necessity nor the wisdom of federal mandatory minimum sentences.").
104. See Zlotnick, supra note 102, at 649 (noting that some federal judges have
resigned "or took senior status and declined to hear criminal cases"); see also Robert W. Pratt, Senseless Sentencing: A FederalJudge Speaks Out, DES MOINES REG. (Jan.
10, 1999), at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v99/n070/aOl.html (highlighting "mind-boggling" cost incarceration puts on taxpayers under federal Sentencing Guidelines); Ian Urbina, New York's FederalJudges Protest Sentencing Procedures,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at Bi (discussing New York federal judges' criticism of
new sentencing law).
105. See Downward DepartureReport, supra note 89, at 31 (noting decrease in
cases sentenced within applicable guideline ranges from 1991 to 2001). "The decline in the rate of within range sentences has been gradual and primarily is reflected in the corresponding increase in the nonsubstantial assistance downward
departure rate." Id.
106. See id. at 32 (graphing upward departure rate at .06 percent of sentences
in 2001).

HeinOnline -- 50 Vill. L. Rev. 183 2005

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50: p. 163

This severity comes from multiple factors. An important one is the
lack of real budgetary constraints on punishment at the federal level.
State correctional budgets tend to comprise a major percentage of available resources. As a result, a number of state sentencing guidelines are
directly tied to correctional resources. To increase sentence lengths for
one category of offenders, other offenders must receive shorter sentences
or the legislature must find additional money for prisons.' 0 7 At the federal level, in contrast, correctional expenditures are a tiny fraction of the
federal budget. There is no meaningful financial check on the punitive
impulses of Congress.
V.

ANALYSIS

Where does this analysis of the flaws of the pre-Bookerworld lead? To
begin, my arguments suggest that sentencing guidelines with more modest
goals are likely to further the major goals of the Sentencing Reform Act,
be more widely acceptable to participants in the federal criminal justice
system and be easier to implement after Booker. Therefore, legislative fixes
designed to evade Booker should be rejected. The main benefit of "topless"
or "upside down" guidelines is that they would allow use of the current
form of the guidelines, or an inverted but equally detailed and complex
version. Given the many weaknesses of "topless" and "upside down" guidelines, the costs of those approaches far outweigh any benefits.
Advisory guidelines in the federal system are more promising, but ultimately seem unlikely to provide enough certainty and consistency in punishment. Advisory guidelines may work well in jurisdictions that are either
small enough that the judges can establish a "culture of compliance" or
where political accountability provides an incentive to follow the guidelines. These factors are absent in the federal system with many life-tenured sentencing judges spread across the country. Appellate review for
unreasonableness may provide a meaningful constraint. Appellate review
that effectively establishes fact-finding requirements, however, may run
afoul of the Apprendi line of cases.
107. See, e.g., Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis
SENTENCING &
CoRREcrIoNs PROGRAM (Vera Inst. of Justice, New York, N.Y.), June 2002, at 7,
available at http://vera.org/publicationpdf/167_263.pdf (discussing state legislation that "directs sentencing commissions to devise sentencing guidelines that
keep prison populations within certain limits");Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Changing
Fortunes or ChangingAttitudes? Sentencing and CorrectionsReforms in 2003, STATE SENTENCING & CORRECrONS PROGRAM (Vera Inst. of Justice, New York, N.Y.), Mar.
2004, at 14, available at www.vera.org/publication-pdf/226-431.pdf (commenting
that budget crises are providing opportunity for sentencing reform); see also Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2000, in 29

Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarcerations?,STATE

CRIME

&JUsTICE 39, 85-105 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002) (reviewing major effects of

sentencing laws on prison sentences and community corrections in North
Carolina).
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Another problem with simply continuing with the current system is
that, no matter how much weight is given to the Sentencing Guidelines
and how often judges follow them, they are still the same deeply flawed
guidelines. There is no reason why the Sentencing Commission could not
simplify and improve the guidelines in an advisory system. The main political incentive for the necessary simplification that is needed is that it provides a way to return to guidelines with the force of law. I find it hard to
believe that, based on its recent history, Congress will accept simplified,
more flexible sentencing guidelines that remain advisory, subject to fairly
loose appellate review.
The best response to Booker is likely to bring the guidelines into compliance by authorizing the use ofjuries to resolve factual disputes. "Bookerizing" the current guidelines, with elaborate fact-finding, could be quite
burdensome, at least compared to the task faced by states impacted by
Booker.1 1 8 Addressing the major deficiencies of the guidelines, however,
would have the added virtue of making compliance with Booker far easier.
The guidelines should be simplified and made more flexible. Far fewer
offense levels with broader ranges within each level are necessary. The
range of facts that go into determining the guideline range and the impact of quantity-based factors should be dramatically reduced. Mandatory
consideration of alleged criminal conduct beyond what the defendant has
been convicted of should be abolished.
These are only general principles; many details need to be worked
out.10 9 Nevertheless, such a system would be a great improvement on the
pre-Booker guidelines and would be quite workable for jury determination
of disputed facts. With fewer facts impacting the guideline range and
broader sentencing ranges diluting the impact of any particular fact, jury
fact-finding would not be unduly burdensome. Combined with more reasonable levels of severity, under this system, plea bargaining would probably remove all but the most serious factual disputes from jury
consideration. For the few remaining disputes, requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt seems appropriate.
108. Complying with Blakely and Booker by submitting contested aggravating
facts to a jury is a much simpler matter for the states affected by those decisions
than for the federal system. All state guidelines systems are principally based on
the offense of conviction, rather than the "real offense" elements embraced by the
federal guidelines. As a result, in most cases in those states, there are no aggravating facts found beyond those implicit in the fact of conviction. For example, a
study by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission found that only about
two percent of sentenced cases in 2002 involved a contested aggravated departure.
See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, supra note 79, at 9 ("[Data indicates
that the impact [of Blakely] should not create a severe crisis within the state's criminal justice system."). For a discussion of Kansas's implementation of a system
where juries consider aggravating facts, see supra note 78.
109. See generally, Frank 0. Bowman, III, Beyond BandAids: A Proposalfor Reconfiguring FederalSentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2005)
(presenting thoughtful recommendations for more flexible guidelines).
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An important question is the impact such simplified, "Booker-ized"
guidelines will have on unwarranted sentencing disparity. The federal
Sentencing Guidelines have probably reduced inter-judge sentencing disparity. 110 Compared with the unfettered discretion of the traditional system, any sentencing guidelines, even if they do not have the force of law,
are likely to accomplish this. Guidelines that do have some force of law
are even more likely to reduce disparity in the sense of similarly situated
defendants receiving different sentences. This, however, is not the only
important question. We must also ask whether unwarranted sentencing
uniformity has increased. 11 ' In other words, does a sentencing system
make appropriate distinctions so that offenders who really ought to receive different sentences do so? In the case of the federal guidelines, it
seems clear that any marginal reduction in disparity that has come from
the complexity and rigidity of the system has been more than offset by
unwarranted uniformity.
The federal system's fixation on reducing disparity borders on the
pathological. 112 It is particularly unwise to focus too narrowly on disparity
when that term is so poorly understood. As a number of scholars have
pointed out, unwarranted sentencing disparity is a very imprecise concept.11 3 This is particularly true when-as is the case in the federal Sentencing Guidelines-no meaningful principles of punishment have been
1 14
adopted to give content to the concept of "similar" yet "different" cases.
110. See generallyJames M. Anderson et al., Measuring Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999)
(providing findings that indicate guidelines have been successful in reducing interjudge sentencing disparity).
111. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 902 (1991) (arguing that disparity is not only
concern). "Some things are worse than sentencing disparity, and we have found
them." Id.; see also DanielJ. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1705 (1992) ("Too
often, the Commission's remedy for disparity is uniformity ....").
112. See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORy L.J. (forthcoming 2005). The controversy surrounding medical malpractice awards is instructive.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the notion that there is a "crisis" requiring
limits on such awards, it is significant that the limitation proposals take the form of
"caps" or increased authority forjudges to reduce awards. To my knowledge, there
has been no major effort to develop specific binding guidelines covering broad
ranges of cases. Instead, the reform effort focuses on that minority of cases that
deviates from a broadly acceptable range of awards. I suggest that this is much
more consistent with the states' approaches to sentencing reform than it is to the
federal Sentencing Guidelines. Again, the federal Sentencing Guidelines stand
alone.
Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 Nw. U. L.
113. See, e.g.,
REv. 1336, 1336 (1997) ("disparity is not a self-defining concept"); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833, 835-37 (1992) (analyzing concept of disparity); see
also Alschuler, supra note 111, at 941 (arguing that "there is a better way for a
sentencing commission to address the problem of disparity").
114. There has been much early and important criticism of the Sentencing
Commission's failure to adopt guiding purposes of punishment. See, e.g., Paul J.
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Relaxing this narrow focus on disparity, and pursuing more modest, attainable goals, would enable "Booker-ized" guidelines to lead to the first
real improvement in the federal Sentencing Guidelines.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Federal sentencing reform needed saving long before Booker, Blakely
and Apprendi. Regardless of the jurisprudential merits of these decisions,
they provide an opportunity to focus Congress's attention on the deep
flaws of the guidelines and mandatory minimums. Someday, Congress will
again look at sentencing with clear eyes, as it did leading up to the Sentencing Reform Act. There is no reason why it should not do so now.
Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. Rrv. 19, 36 (2003)
(noting goal of Sentencing Reform Act is "equal treatment for similar offenders,"
but guidelines fail to accomplish it); Marc Miller, Purposesat Sentencing, 66 S. CAL.
L. REi. 413, 418 (1992) (commenting that "a reasoned sentencing approach may
best be met when both rule makers and judges assess sentencing purposes for
groups of offenders rather than the sentencing system as a whole"); Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The PhilosophicalPremises of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 642 (2003) (applying "rational reconstruction" to
conclude that only utilitarianism explains criminal history, offense seriousness,
family ties and substantial assistance guidelines).
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